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ABSTRACT
Can variants of the classic Calvo (1983) model of sticky prices account for the statistical behavior
of post-war US inflation? We develop and test versions of the model for which the answer to this
question is yes. We then investigate whether these models imply plausible degrees of inertia in price
setting behavior by firms. We find that they do, but only if we depart from two auxiliary
assumptions made in standard expositions of the Calvo model. These assumptions are that
monopolistically competitive firms face a constant elasticity of demand and capital can be
instantaneously reallocated after a shock. When we modify these assumptions our model is
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This paper addresses two questions. First, can variants of the Calvo (1983) sticky price model
account for the statistical behavior of post-war U.S. inﬂation rates? Second, can these models
succeed statistically with plausible degrees of inertia in pricing setting behavior at the ﬁrm
level? Our answer to the ﬁr s tq u e s t i o ni sy e s . O u ra n s w e rt ot h es e c o n dq u e s t i o ni sa l s o
y e s ,b u to n l yi fw ed e p a r tf r o mt w oa u x i l i a r ya s s u m p t i o n sm a d ei ns t a n d a r de x p o s i t i o n s
of the Calvo model. These assumptions are that monopolistically competitive ﬁr m sf a c ea
constant elasticity of demand and capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Under these assumptions, our
estimated model implies that ﬁrms re-optimize prices roughly once every two years. This
ﬁnding motivates us to consider a variant of the model in which the elasticity of demand
facing ﬁr m si sv a r i a b l ea n dc a p i t a li sﬁrm-speciﬁc. The resulting model is observationally
equivalent to the original model in terms of its implications for the aggregate time series
used in our analysis. However, inference about how frequently ﬁrms re-optimize prices is
aﬀected in an important way. This model is consistent with the view that ﬁrms re-optimize
prices on average once every two quarters.
Despite ongoing controversies, models embodying sticky prices continue to play a central
role in analyses of the monetary transmission mechanism. In time-dependent sticky price
models, the number of ﬁrms that change prices in any given period is speciﬁed exogenously.1
In state-dependent pricing models, the number of ﬁrms changing prices in any given period
is determined endogenously.2 While state-dependent models seem promising (at least to us)
they are substantially more diﬃcult to work with than time-dependent models. Perhaps
more importantly, empirically plausible versions of time and state-dependent models often
generate similar results for many policy experiments that are relevant in moderate inﬂation
economies.3 Here we take as given the widespread interest in time-dependent models and
1Classic models of this sort were developed by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Modern variants are now
central elements of a large class of models. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004),
Erceg, Henderson and Levon (2000), Gali and Gertler (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Yun
(1996).
2Important recent examples of state-dependent pricing models include Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999),
Burstein (2003) and Golosov and Lucas (2003).
3See, for example, Burstein (2002) and Klenow and Krystov (2003). In contrast, Golosov and Lucas
(2003) argue that the shock repsonses in their model are very diﬀerent from the analog responses in a Calvo-
type model. It is not clear whether this would be the case in a version of the Golosov and Lucas model
calibrated to the ﬁnding in Klenow and Krystov (2003) that 90% of monthly US inﬂation stems solely from
ﬂuctuations in the average size of price changes, as opposed to the fraction of ﬁrms who change prices.
2focus on the empirical properties of Calvo-style models.
We interpret the Calvo price-setting mechanism as capturing ﬁrms’ responses to various
costs of changing prices. The basic idea is that in the presence of these costs, ﬁrms fully
optimize prices only periodically, and follow simple rules for changing their prices at other
times. The type of costs we have in mind are those associated with optimization (e.g., costs
associated with information gathering, decision making, negotiation and communication).
These costs are diﬀerent from menu costs, which apply to all price changes.4 Consequently,
we estimate and test variants of Calvo-style models where ﬁr m s ,w h od on o tr e - o p t i m i z e
their prices, index their price either to the unconditional rate of inﬂation (static indexation)
or lagged inﬂation (dynamic indexation). In addition, we allow for the possibility that there
is a lag between the time at which ﬁrms re-optimize their price plans and the time at which
they implement the new plan. In our model, this lag is equivalent to the assumption that
ﬁrms re-optimize time prices based on an information set that only includes lagged values of
marginal cost. For convenience, we proceed under the “implementation lag” interpretation.
Our main statistical ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd strong evidence
against the model if we assume that ﬁrms instantly implement new price plans. This ﬁnding
is true for both the static and dynamic indexation versions of the model. However, when
we allow for a one-period implementation lag of new pricing plans, neither the static nor
dynamic indexation versions of the model can be rejected using conventional statistical tests.
Interestingly, this is the speciﬁcation of the Calvo model adopted in Galí and Gertler (1999)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004), among others.
Standard tests of the model’s over-identifying restrictions may have low power against
speciﬁc alternatives. Galí and Gertler (1999) argue this is the case when the Calvo model
is confronted with the possibility that some ﬁrms adopt backward-looking rules of thumb
for setting prices. Consistent with Galí and Gertler (1999), we ﬁnd evidence against the
hypothesis that there are no rule-of-thumb ﬁr m si fw ea s s u m et h a to p t i m i z i n gﬁrms adopt a
static indexation rule. However, we ﬁnd virtually no evidence against this hypothesis if we
assume that optimizing ﬁrms adopt a dynamic indexation rule.
Evidently, allowing for a one-quarter delay in the implementation of new prices and
dynamic indexation renders the standard Calvo model consistent with the aggregate data
4Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta and Bergen (2000) provide some microeconomic evidence that costs
associated with reoptimization are much more important than menu costs.
3in a statistical sense. But that does not mean the estimated model makes economic sense.
Here, the key question is whether the model implies plausible inertia in price setting behavior
by ﬁrms. Taken at face value, the answer to this question is no. Speciﬁcally, the estimated
version of our preferred model implies that ﬁrms re-optimize prices, on average, roughly once
every two years. This implication seems implausible to us and would justify rejection of the
Calvo model.
As it turns out, this inference about price inertia at the ﬁrm level is warranted only
under very special auxiliary assumptions associated with the Calvo model; namely, that price
setting ﬁrms face a constant elasticity of demand and capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Following
Kimball (1995), we allow for the possibility that the elasticity of demand is increasing in
a ﬁrm’s price. In addition, we follow Woodford (2003) and allow for the possibility that
capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. In this speciﬁcation, a ﬁrm’s capital can only be augmented with a
one-period delay using ﬁnal goods, subject to adjustment costs. For reasons discussed below,
each of these extensions enable the Calvo model to account for the dynamics of inﬂation with
lower degrees of price rigidity.
We demonstrate that the parameters of the extended Calvo model are not separately
identiﬁed using aggregate time series data. In particular, one cannot separately identify
the probability that a ﬁrm re-optimizes its price, the nature of demand elasticities, and the
degree of capital mobility. Still, we can identify the frequency of re-optimization if we have
information about demand elasticities and the degree of capital mobility.
If we assume that capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and there are modest costs of adjusting capital,
then the model implies a degree of inertia in price re-optimization that is much more plausible
than that implied by the benchmark Calvo model. Depending on our assumptions about
demand elasticities, our measure of inﬂation, and the sample period under consideration,
we infer that ﬁrms re-optimize prices between once every 2.3 and 3.0 quarters. In no case
can we reject, at conventional conﬁdence intervals, the hypothesis that ﬁrms re-optimize
prices once every 1.8 quarters. While there are ambiguities involved in the comparison, this
result renders our model consistent with the micro evidence discussed in Klenow and Krystov
(2003) and Golosov and Lucas (2003).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our extended version
of the Calvo model. In Section 3 we display our econometric strategy for testing the model,
including the variant that allows for rule-of-thumb ﬁrms. Section 4 discusses the data that
4we use. Section 5 presents our statistical results. In Section 6 we interpret the parameters
of the estimated model. Finally, Section 7 contains brief concluding remarks.
2. The Calvo Model of Sticky Prices
In this section we display an extended version of the Calvo model. In the ﬁrst subsection
we consider a version of the model in which intermediate good ﬁrms face a non-constant
elasticity of demand for their output. In addition, we allow for a ﬁnite lag between the time
ﬁrms re-optimize prices and when they implement new plans. In the second subsection we
assume that capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and can only be augmented with a one-period delay.
2.1. The Calvo Model with Non Constant Elasticity of Demand
At time t,aﬁnal good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm. The ﬁrm does so




G(Yit/Yt)di =1 . (1)
Here G is increasing, strictly concave, G(1) = 1 and Yit denotes the input of intermediate
good i. This speciﬁcation corresponds to the one adopted in Kimball (1995). The standard
Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation corresponds to the special case:
G(Yit/Yt)=( Yit/Yt)
(µ−1)/µ, µ>1.
We refer to the general version of G(·) as the Kimball speciﬁcation.
The ﬁnal good ﬁrm chooses Yt and Yit to maximize proﬁts, PtYt −
R 1
0 PitYitdi, subject to
(1). Here Pt and Pit denote the time t price of the ﬁnal and intermediate good i, respectively.












Throughout, the symbol ‘0’ denotes the derivative operator and G0−1(·) denotes the inverse
function of G0(·). Our assumptions on G(·) imply that the ﬁrm’s demand for input Yit is
decreasing in its relative price.5







where 0 < α < 1. Here, Hit and Kit denote time t labor and capital services used to produce
intermediate good i, respectively. Intermediate good ﬁrms rent capital and labor in economy-
wide, perfectly competitive factor markets. With this speciﬁcation, individual ﬁrms do not
view their own capital stock as predetermined within the period. The variable Zt denotes
possible stochastic disturbances to technology.
Proﬁts are distributed to the ﬁrms’ owners at the end of each time period. Let st denote
the representative ﬁrm’s real marginal cost. Given our assumptions on factor markets, all
ﬁrms have identical marginal costs. Consequently, we do not index st by i. Marginal cost
depends on the parameter α and factor prices that the ﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e n .T h eﬁrm’s time
t proﬁts are [Pit/Pt − st]PtYit, where Pit is the price of intermediate good i.
Intermediate good ﬁrms set prices according to a variant of the mechanism spelled out
in Calvo (1983). In each period, a ﬁrm faces a constant probability, 1 − θ, of being able to
re-optimize its nominal price. So, on average, a ﬁrm re-optimizes its price every (1 − θ)−1
periods. The ﬁrm’s ability to re-optimize its price is independent across ﬁrms and time. For
now, we leave open the issue of what information set the ﬁrm has when it resets its price.
We consider two scenarios for what happens if a ﬁrm does not re-optimize its price. In
the ﬁrst scenario, the ﬁrm adopts what we call the static indexing scheme, i.e., it updates
5To obtain this result we use the fact that, given our assumptions on G, if x = G
0−1(z), then
dG0−1(z)/dz =1 /G00(x).
6its price according to the rule:
Pit =¯ πPit−1. (4)
Here ¯ π is the long-run average gross rate of inﬂation.6 In the second scenario, the ﬁrm adopts
what we call the dynamic indexing scheme, i.e., it sets its price according to7
Pit = πt−1Pit−1. (5)
Let P∗
t denote the value of Pit set by a ﬁrm that can re-optimize its price. In addition, let
Y ∗
t denote the time t output of this ﬁrm. Our notation does not allow P∗
t or Y ∗
t to depend
on i because all ﬁrms who can re-optimize their price at time t c h o o s et h es a m ep r i c e( s e e
Woodford, 1996 and Yun, 1996). In what follows we focus, for convenience, on speciﬁcation
















subject to (2). Here, Et−τ denotes the conditional expectations operator and the ﬁrm’s t−τ
information set, which includes the realization of all model variables dated t−τ and earlier.
In addition, vt+l is the time-varying portion of the ﬁrm’s discount factor. The intermediate
good ﬁrm views st,P t,v t and λt as exogenous stochastic processes beyond its control.
Let p∗
t = P∗
t /Pt. Log linearizing the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm around the relevant





















Throughout, ˆ xt denotes the percent deviation of a variable xt from its steady-state value.
For future reference it is useful to write ˆ st as










6Other authors who make this assumption include Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Yun (1996).
7See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004) for a discussion of this form of indexation.
7Note that ˆ st depends only on economy-wide variables, which an individual ﬁrm views as
beyond its control.
Several features of (7) are worth emphasizing. First, if inﬂation is expected to be at its
steady state level and real marginal cost is expected to remain constant after time t, then
the ﬁrm sets b p∗
t = AEt−τˆ st. That is, the percent deviation in the ﬁrm’s relative price is
a constant markup of the expected deviation of marginal cost from its steady-state value.
Second, suppose the ﬁrm expects real marginal costs to be higher in the future than at time
t. Anticipating those higher future marginal costs, the ﬁrm sets b p∗
t higher than AEt−τˆ st.
It does so because it understands that it may not be able to raise its price when higher
marginal costs materialize. Third, suppose ﬁrms expect future inﬂation to exceed its steady-
state level. To avoid a decline in its relative price, the ﬁrm incorporates expected changes
in the inﬂation rate into b p∗
t.
T h ed e g r e et ow h i c hb p∗
t responds to current and future values of ˆ st is increasing in A,
which in turn depends on the properties of G(·). One way to interpret A is that it governs
the degree of pass-through from a rise in marginal cost to prices. For example, according
to (7), a highly persistent 1% increase in time t marginal cost from its steady state value
induces the ﬁrm to initially raise its relative price by approximately A percent.
Ad i ﬀerent way to interpret A involves the elasticity of demand for a given intermediate
good, η(x)=−G0(x)/(xG00(x)), where x = Y ∗





where ² =( ˜ P/η(1))(∂η(1)/∂ ˜ P).T h e v a r i a b l e ² is the percent change in the elasticity of
demand due to a one percent change in the relative price of the good, evaluated in steady
state. The variable ζ denotes the ﬁrm’s steady state markup, η(1)/(η(1) − 1) − 1.I n t h e
standard Dixit Stiglitz case, ² is equal to zero and A is equal to one.
Relations (9) and (7) imply that the larger is ², the lower is A and the less responsive
is b p∗
t to current and future values of ˆ st. To understand these relationships, recall that, other
things being equal, a rise in marginal cost induces a ﬁrm to increase its price. A higher value
of ² means that, for any given rise in its price, the more elastic is the demand curve for the
ﬁrm’s good. So, relative to the case where ² =0 , the ﬁrm will raise its price by less. As we
discuss below, this means that inﬂation will respond by less to movements in marginal cost.
8Zero proﬁts in the ﬁnal goods sector and our assumptions about the distribution of θ


















Linearizing this relationship around the steady-state values of the variables in (10) yields
the standard relationship b p∗
t = θˆ πt/(1 − θ). Combining this equation and (7) we obtain
ˆ πt = βEt−τˆ πt+1 +
(1 − βθ)(1− θ)
θ
AEt−τˆ st. (11)
When τ =0and A =1(the Dixit-Stiglitz case), (11) reduces to the standard relationship
between inﬂation and marginal costs studied in the literature.8
Iterating forward on (11) yields
ˆ πt =







Relation (12) makes clear a central prediction of the model: deviations of inﬂation from its
steady state value depend only on ﬁrms’ expectations of current and future deviations of
real marginal cost from its steady state value. The lower is A, i.e., the more sensitive is
the elasticity of demand for intermediate goods to price changes, the less responsive is ˆ πt to
changes in expected values of ˆ st+j. Similarly, the higher is θ, the smaller will be the response
of ˆ πt to expected changes in marginal cost. So the version of the Calvo model considered in
this subsection has two distinct mechanisms that can account for a small response of inﬂation
to movements in marginal cost.














l (ˆ st+l − ˆ st+l−1)
#
8We derived (11) by linearizing around steady state inﬂation ¯ π. Various authors assume that ﬁrms which
do not reoptimize prices leave their price unchanged, i.e., Pit = Pit−1. The model is then linearized around
¯ π =1 . Since ˆ πt is deﬁned as the percentage deviation from steady state, (11) does not depend on the assumed
value of ¯ π.
9and (11) takes the form
∆ˆ πt = βEt−τ∆ˆ πt+1 +
(1 − βθ)(1− θ)
θ
AEt−τˆ st. (13)
In addition, (12) is replaced by
∆ˆ πt =







Here, ∆ denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator. Notice that with dynamic indexation, it is the
ﬁrst diﬀerence of ˆ πt that is a weighted average of expected current and future values of ˆ st.
2.2. Firm-speciﬁc Capital
Standard variants of the Calvo model assume that ﬁrms rent capital and purchase labor
services in perfectly competitive economy-wide markets. Woodford (2003) has proposed a
variant of the Calvo model in which capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. In this speciﬁcation, a ﬁrm’s cap-
ital can only be augmented with a one-period delay using ﬁnal goods, subject to adjustment
costs. These assumptions imply that, unlike the case in which capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
intermediate good ﬁrms do not view marginal costs as being beyond their ability to control.
As we show below, this perturbation of the Calvo model allows it to account for the time
series behavior of inﬂation with less inertia in ﬁrms’ pricing plans, i.e., lower values of θ.
The basic intuition for this claim can be described as follows. With ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital,
a ﬁrm’s marginal cost depends partly on economy-wide factors such as the real wage rate
and the aggregate level of technology. But, because its stock of capital is predetermined, a
ﬁrm’s marginal cost is also an increasing function of its output. Consider a shock that raises
the economy-wide component of marginal costs, such as a rise in the real wage rate. Other
things equal, a ﬁrm that is re-optimizing its price will respond by planning to raise its price.
However, this rise in price reduces output, which leads to a countervailing fall in marginal
cost. Therefore, the ﬁrm will plan to raise its price by less than it would have were capital
not predetermined. The presence of adjustment costs implies that the ﬁrm will only slowly
adjust its stock of capital. Consequently, the dynamic eﬀects stemming from adjustment
costs reinforce the eﬀects of predetermined capital on ﬁrms’ pricing decisions.
To be concrete, we now brieﬂy describe a version of Woodford’s (2003) model in which
10ﬁnal output is produced using the Kimball speciﬁcation (see (1)). We refer the reader to the
appendix for details. The model is identical to the one described in the previous subsection
except for the nature of capital. At time t, ﬁrm i’s capital, Kit,i sg i v e n . T h eﬁrm can
augment its capital by purchasing time t output of the ﬁnal good sector. But it does so
subject to convex capital adjustment costs. Speciﬁcally, increasing capital to Kit+1 in period






The function Q(·) satisﬁes the following properties: Q(1) = δ, Q0(1) = 1 and Q00(1) = ψ,
where 0 < δ < 1 and ψ ≥ 0. In non-stochastic steady state, investment is equal to δ times
the steady-state capital stock. So, we can interpret δ as the steady-state rate of capital
depreciation. The parameter ψ controls the degree of adjustment costs. For simplicity,
we assume that capital decisions are made subject to the same timing constraints as price
decisions. Speciﬁcally, we assume Iit is chosen at time t − τ. When τ =1 , this assumption
coincides with the corresponding assumption in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004).
The average marginal cost across ﬁrms is st =
R 1
0 sitdi, where sit is the relevant measure
of marginal cost entering into ﬁrm i’s pricing decisions. In the appendix we show that the
marginal cost for ﬁrm i satisﬁes










ˆ Kit − ˆ Kt
i
.
Here, ˆ st is given by (8). Unlike the case in which capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, ﬁrm i’s marginal
cost is not beyond its control.9 Instead, ˆ sit is an increasing function of ﬁrm i’s output relative
to economy wide output and a decreasing function of ﬁrm i’s capital stock relative to the
economy-wide stock of capital.
With the static indexation scheme, the analog to (11) is
ˆ πt = βEt−τˆ πt+1 +
(1 − βθ)(1− θ)
θ
· A · D · Et−τˆ st, (16)
where A is deﬁn e da si n( 9 )a n dD is a function of the underlying parameters of the model
9Without ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, ˆ Yit = ˆ Yt and ˆ Kit = ˆ Kt and ˆ sit =ˆ st.
11(see the Appendix). For simplicity, we summarize this relationship as
D = d(β,α,δ,ψ,θ,ζ,²). (17)
Under dynamic indexation, the analog to (13) is
∆ˆ πt = βEt−τ∆ˆ πt+1 +
(1 − βθ)(1− θ)
θ
· A · D · Et−τˆ st.
For the parameter values that we consider, D ≤ 1. So, for any given value of θ, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital, like a non-constant elasticity of demand, reduces the response of ˆ πt to movements
in ˆ st. So ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital gives rise to an additional mechanism that generates a small
response of inﬂation to movements in ˆ st.




1+¯ ηαA/(1 − α)
.
Under Dixit-Stiglitz, A =1and ¯ η = µ, in which case D corresponds to the coeﬃcient in the
model considered by Sbordone (2002) and Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001). The key
characteristic of that model is that each ﬁrm has a ﬁxed stock of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
3. Assessing the Empirical Plausibility of the Model
In this section we discuss two strategies for estimating and testing our variants of the Calvo
model. The ﬁrst corresponds to the strategy pioneered by Hansen (1982) and Hansen and
Singleton (1982) and applied to the Calvo model by Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler
and López-Salido (2001). The ideai st oe x p l o i tt h ef a c tt h a ti nany model incorporating
Calvo pricing, certain restrictions must hold. One can analyze these restrictions, without
making assumptions about other aspects of the economy. We test these restrictions using
Hansen’s (1982) ‘J statistic’.
A possible shortcoming of tests based on the J statistic is that they may have low power
against speciﬁc alternatives. Galí and Gertler (1999) argue that this is the case when the
Calvo model is confronted with the possibility that some ﬁrms adopt backward-looking ‘rule
of thumb’ rules for setting prices. In the second subsection we incorporate this type of ﬁrm
12into our analysis and discuss one strategy to test for their presence. An alternative to the
limited information methods that we use is to embed our version of the Calvo pricing model
within a fully articulated general equilibrium model. One could then estimate and test
the model using maximum likelihood methods. Two interesting examples of this approach
include Linde (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
3.1. Testable Implications of the Calvo Model
To derive the testable implications of the Calvo model, it is convenient to focus on the model
with static indexation and deﬁne the random variable
ψt+1 =ˆ πt − βˆ πt+1 −
(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)
θ
· A · D · ˆ st. (18)
Since ˆ πt is in agents’ time t − τ information set, (16) can be written as:
Et−τψt+1(σ)=0 ,
where σ denotes the structural parameters of the model. It follows that
Eψt+1(σ)Xt−τ =0 (19)
for any k dimensional vector Xt−τ in agents’ time t − τ information set. We exploit (19) to
estimate the true value of σ, σ0, and test the over-identifying restrictions of the model using
Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Method of Moments procedure.10
Our estimate of σ is
















10We require that {ˆ πt, ˆ st,X t} is a stationary and ergodic process.
13Here, T denotes the size of our sample and WT is a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix that can
depend on sample information. The choice of WT that minimizes the asymptotic covariance
matrix of ˆ σ is a consistent estimate of the spectral density matrix of {ψt+1(σ0)Xt−τ} at
frequency zero. Our theory implies that ψt+1(σ)Xt−τ has a moving average representation
of order τ. So we choose W
−1





The minimized value of the GMM criterion function, JT, is asymptotically distributed as
a chi-squared random variable with degrees of freedom equal to the diﬀerence between the
number of unconditional moment restrictions imposed (k) and the number of parameters
being estimated.11
One does not have to impose the restriction that ψt+1(σ)Xt−τ has an MA(τ) represen-
tation when constructing an estimate of W
−1
T . Speciﬁcally, one could allow for higher-order
serial correlation in the error term than the theory implies. However, as we describe below,
whether one does so or not has an important impact, in practice, on inference.
It is evident from (18) and (20) - (22) that θ,Aand D are not separately identiﬁed. All
that can be identiﬁed given the assumptions made so far is the reduced form parameter
c = A · D ·
(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)
θ
. (24)
However, given any estimate of c,ˆ c, and assumed values for A and D, one can deduce the




(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)
. (25)
Here A is function of ζ and ². When capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, one can deduce θ using (17) and
A =
θˆ c
D(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)
. (26)
11According to relation (12), ˆ πt is predetermined at time t−τ. If we were only interested in assessing the
hypothesis that inﬂation is predetermined at time t − τ, we could test whether any variable dated between
time t − τ and t has explanatory power for time t inﬂation.
14The previous discussion implies that, given priors about a key subset of the model’s
structural parameters and the nature of capital markets, we can deduce the degree of inertia
in price optimization (θ) required to render the extended Calvo model consistent with the
aggregate time series data.
3.2. Testing the Calvo Model Against a SpeciﬁcA l t e r n a t i v e
Galí and Gertler (1999) have argued it is necessary to allow for backward looking ‘rule of
thumb’ ﬁrms to render the Calvo model consistent with the data. Here we show how to
incorporate the presence of Galí - Gertler-type ‘rule of thumb’ ﬁrms into our analysis.12 As
in our basic model, we consider two cases corresponding to whether optimizing ﬁrms update
their prices using static or dynamic optimization rules. For simplicity, we derive the model
under the assumption that capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁca n dA =1 .
Optimizing Firms With Static Indexation
Following Galí and Gertler (1999), we assume that there are two types of ﬁrms in the
economy. A fraction (1 − ω) of intermediate good ﬁrms are optimizing Calvo type ﬁrms.
That is, they face a constant probability, 1 − θ, of being able to re-optimize their nominal
price. As above, when they re-optimize, they solve problem (6) subject to (2). When they do
not re-optimize, they adopt the static optimization scheme, (4). A fraction ω of intermediate
good ﬁrms adopt the rule of thumb for setting prices discussed in Galí and Gertler (1999).
With probability θ, rule of thumb ﬁrm i sets its price according to13
Pit =¯ πPit−1. (27)
With probability (1 − θ), this ﬁrm sets its price according to
P
0
t = πt−1 ¯ Pt−1. (28)
12An important motivation for introducing ‘rule- of-thumb’ ﬁrms is the observed inertia in inﬂation. See
Linde (2001) for a discussion of the diﬃculties that standard dynamic general equilibrium models have in
accounting for the backward-looking component of inﬂation.
13This rule is precisely the same as the one considered by Gali and Gertler (1999) except that they assume
¯ π =1 . As explained above, this assumption has no impact on the estimation equations used in the analysis.
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Log linearizing (27) - (30) and combining the resulting expressions with (7), one can show








(1 − ω)(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)
φ
Et−τˆ st (31)
where φ = θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)]. As long as ω > 0, rule-of-thumb ﬁrms generate additional
persistence in inﬂa t i o ni nt h es e n s et h a tπt−1 appears in (31). When ω =0 ,(31) collapses to
the analog expression for ˆ πt in the standard Calvo model with static indexing.
Optimizing Firms With Dynamic Indexation
We now modify the version of the Galí-Gertler model discussed above on exactly one
dimension: we assume that optimizing ﬁrms adopt the dynamic optimization scheme (5)













Replacing (30) with (32) in the derivation with static indexation, one can show that the
analog to (11) is given by
∆ˆ πt =
βθ
φ0 ∆ˆ πt+1 + ωθ
φ0 (1 − ω)∆ˆ πt−1
+ωθ





0 = θ(1 − ω)+ω. Notice that rule of thumb ﬁrms imply that both ∆ˆ πt−1 and ˆ πt−1
appear in the equilibrium relationship determining ∆ˆ πt. When ω =0 ,(33) collapses to the
analog expression for ˆ πt in the standard Calvo model under the dynamic indexing scheme.
Estimation and Testing
16We estimate the parameters of the model described in this section using the methodology
and instruments described in section 4.1. The key modiﬁcation is that, under static index-
ation, equation (31) replaces (11). Under dynamic indexation, (33) replaces (13). To test
the model against the general alternative that the model is misspeciﬁed, we use Hansen’s JT
statistic. More interestingly, in the present context, we can test the standard Calvo model
against the speciﬁc alternative that there exist rule-of-thumb ﬁrms by assessing whether the
parameter ω is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
4. Data
Our benchmark sample period is 1959:1 - 2001:4. However, numerous observers have argued
that there was an important change in the nature of monetary policy with the advent of
the Volker disinﬂation in the early 1980s. It is also often argued that the Fed’s operating
procedures were diﬀerent in the early 1980s than in the post-1982 period. Accordingly, we
re-estimated the model over the two distinct subsamples used in Galí, Lopez-Salido and
Vallés (2003): 1959:1-1979:2 and 1982:3- 2001:4. We report results for two measures of
inﬂation: the GDP deﬂator and the price deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures.14
We measure ˆ πt as the diﬀerence between actual time t inﬂation and the sample average of
inﬂation.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ec a p i t a li sn o tﬁrm-speciﬁc, real marginal costs are equal to the real
product wage divided by the marginal product of labor. Production function (3) implies that
real marginal cost is proportional to labor’s share in national income, WtHt/(PtYt),w h e r e
Wt is the nominal wage. In practice, we measure WtHt as nominal labor compensation in the
non-farm business sector. Our measure of PtYt is nominal output of the non-farm business
sector. The variable ˆ st is measured as the diﬀerence between the log of the time t value of
our measure of labor’s share in national income and its sample average. This is a standard
measure of ˆ st which has been used by Galí and Gertler (1999), Galí et. al. (2001) and
Sbordone (2002). As it turns out, this is the correct measure of ˆ st even when capital is
ﬁrm-speciﬁc (see the Appendix).
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) discuss possible corrections to this measure that are
14All data sources are listed in the Appendix. We also considered the price deﬂator for the non-farm
business sector and the consumer price index (CPI) and found that our key results are insensitive to these
alternative measures.
17appropriate for diﬀerent assumptions about technology. These corrections include those that
take into account a non-constant elasticity of factor substitution between capital and labor
and the presence of overhead costs and labor adjustment costs. We redid our analysis for
these alternative measures of marginal costs and found that they do not aﬀect the qualitative
nature of our results.15
Consider next the instrument vector Xt−τ.L e t Zt denote the four-dimensional vector
consisting of the time t value of real marginal cost, quadratically detrended real GDP, inﬂa-
tion, and the growth rate of nominal wages in the non farm business sector. Our speciﬁcation
of Xt−τ is given by16
Xt−τ = {1,Z t−τ,ψt−τ}
0.
We include lagged values of the Euler error, ψt, because we found that doing so increased
the power of our statistical tests (see below).
5. Empirical Results
In this section we present our empirical results. To facilitate comparisons with the literature,
we report point estimates of θ corresponding to the identifying assumption that capital is
mobile and G(·) in (1) is of the Dixit-Stiglitz form. The ﬁrst subsection reports results for
the case in which there are no delays in implementing new optimal price decisions (τ =0 ) .
When A =1and capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, this case corresponds to the standard Calvo model.
In the second subsection, we discuss the impact of allowing for a delay in implementing new
optimal price decisions. In the third subsection, we report results for the Galí and Gertler
(1999) ‘rule of thumb’ version of the model.
15See also Gagnon and Khan (2004) who study versions of the Calvo model under diﬀerent assumptions
about marginal cost.
16Gali and Gertler (1999) use an instrument list consisting of a constant and lagged values of Zt , where
the latter is augmented to include an index of commodity prices and the spread between the annual interest
rate on the ten year Treasury Bond and three month bill. We redid our basic analysis, setting Xt to
{1,Z t−j,j =0 ,1,2,3}0 and {1,Z t−j,j =1 ,2,3,4}. Gali et..al. (2001) adopt the same speciﬁcation as we
do but set Xt = {1,Z t−j,j =1 ,2,3,4}. It turns out that the point estimates are similar across diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of Xt, including the one used in this paper. However, using a larger set of instruments
leads to misleading inference about the plausibility of the overidentifying restrictions implied by the model.
Speciﬁcally, often we cannot reject the model with a larger set of instruments on the basis of the JT statistic,
but we can do so with the smaller set of instruments.
185.1. The Standard Calvo Model
We begin by analyzing results for the standard Calvo model (τ =0 ) in the case where ﬁrms
adopt the static indexing scheme. The top panel of Table 1 summarizes results obtained using
the full sample. We report our estimate of the parameter θ (standard error in parenthesis)
and the JT s t a t i s t i c( p - v a l u ei ns q u a r eb r a c k e t s ) .T h el a b e lL refers to the maximal degree
of serial correlation that we allow for when estimating the weighting matrix WT. Initially we
consider two values for L :( i )L =0 , which corresponds to the degree of serial correlation
in ψt+1 implied by this version of the model, and (ii) L =1 2 , the value used by Galí and
Gertler (1999). Both values of L are admissible. But, by setting L to zero we are imposing
all of the restrictions implied by the model. This restriction may lead to greater eﬃciency
of our estimator and more power in our test of the model’s over-identifying restrictions.
Recall that Table 1 presents our estimates of the model’s parameters under the assump-
tion that A and D equal one. Notice that θ is estimated with relatively small standard
errors. In addition, the point estimate itself is reasonably robust across the diﬀerent inﬂa-
tion measures and the two values of L, ranging from a low of 0.87 to a high of 0.91.T h i s
implies that on average, ﬁrms wait between 7.5 and 11 quarters before re-optimizing their
prices. This result is consistent with ﬁndings in Smets and Wouters (2003) who ﬁnd, using
maximum likelihood methods, that high degrees of price inertia are required to render a
standard Calvo model consistent with the data. This result is also consistent with ﬁndings
in Galí and Gertler (1999).
We hesitate to attribute much importance to these point estimates. When L =1 2 , the
m o d e lc a n n o tb er e j e c t e da tt h e1% signiﬁcance level, although it can be rejected at the
5% signiﬁcance level. However, when we set L =0 , the model is strongly rejected for both
inﬂation measures. Evidently, imposing all of the relevant restrictions implied by the model
on the weighting matrix has an important impact on inference.
The middle and bottom panels of Table 1 report our sub-sample results. Note that when
L =1 2 , there is virtually no evidence against the model for either measure of inﬂation,
regardless of which subsample we consider. As with the full sample results, inference is
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by setting L =0 . In the ﬁr s ts a m p l ep e r i o d ,t h em o d e li sn o wr e j e c t e d
at the 5% signiﬁcance level for both measures of inﬂation. In the second subsample, the model
is decisively rejected using data from the second subsample when we measure inﬂation using
the GDP deﬂator. There is considerably less evidence against the model in this case when
19we use the PCE deﬂator-based measure of inﬂation. Comparing the point estimates in the
three panels, we see that inference about θ is reasonably robust to allowing for a split in the
sample. As above, we are hesitant to attach much importance to this result in light of the
overall statistical evidence against the standard Calvo model.
Table 2 reports results when we allow for dynamic indexation. The key result to note
is that this version of the model is also rejected when we set L =0 . Viewed overall, we
conclude that there is strong statistical evidence against the standard Calvo model.
5.2. Alternative Timing Assumptions
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the model when τ =1and we assume that ﬁrms
adopt the static indexation scheme, (4). In the previous subsection we showed that imposing
the degree of serial correlation in ψt+1 implied by the model on the estimator of the weighting
matrix, WT, improves the power of our statistical tests. So, for the remainder of the analysis,
we report results only for the case where these restrictions are imposed. In the case of τ =1 ,
this means setting L =1 . The instruments used are
Xt−1 = {1,Z t−1,ψt−1}
0. (34)
Two key results from Table 3 are worth reporting. First, regardless of which sample
period we consider or which measure of inﬂation we use, there is virtually no statistical
evidence against the model. Second, θ is estimated with reasonable precision with the point
estimates ranging from a low of 0.83 to a high of 0.91. This corresponds to ﬁrms changing
prices on average from between 6 quarters and 11 quarters, which seems implausible high.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the model when τ =1a n dw ea s s u m et h a t
ﬁrms adopt the dynamic indexation scheme, (5). As with the static indexing scheme, there
is virtually no statistical evidence against the model. Moreover, the point estimates of the
parameters θ are quite similar, now ranging from a low 0.83 to a high of 0.89.
We conclude that allowing for a one period lag (τ =1 )in the implementation of new
pricing plans is suﬃcient to overturn our statistical evidence against the standard Calvo
m o d e l .B u ti ti sn o ts u ﬃcient to generate economically plausible parameter estimates of the
degree of inertia in price re-optimization. Note, however, that this conclusion is conditional
on the assumption that intermediate goods are combined via a Dixit-Stiglitz technology to
20produce ﬁnal goods (A =1 )and that capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc (D =1 ) . Before exploring
the quantitative trade-oﬀ between the parameter A, the nature of capital markets, and the
degree of price stickiness, we investigate the claim that the standard Calvo model must be
modiﬁed to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb ﬁrms.
5.3. ‘Rule of Thumb’ Firms
We now report the results of estimating the Calvo model, modiﬁed to allow for backward-
looking ‘rule of thumb’ ﬁrms. We begin by conﬁrming Galí and Gertler’s result that there is
evidence of backward looking ﬁrms under the static indexation scheme. We then show that
this evidence disappears under the dynamic indexing scheme. Throughout we assume, as do
Galí and Gertler, that τ =1 .
Table 5 summarizes our results for the static indexation case. Four key ﬁndings are
worth noting. First, using the full sample, we estimate that roughly 50% of ﬁrms behave
in a rule-of-thumb manner, with the exact percent depending on how we measure inﬂation.
In both cases, we can reject, at conventional signiﬁcance levels, the null hypothesis that
there are no rule-of-thumb ﬁrms (ω =0 ) . Second, there is virtually no evidence against the
over-identifying restrictions imposed by the model. Third, the point estimates of θ still seem
implausibly large. Fourth, there is little evidence of rule-of-thumb ﬁr m so n c ew ea l l o wf o ra
split in the sample if we measure inﬂation using the GDP deﬂator. But there is still evidence
that ω is greater than zero when we measure inﬂation using the PCE deﬂator, at least in
the second subsample.
Viewed overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with Galí and Gertler’s conclusion
that the standard Calvo model with static indexation is rejected when we test it against
a speciﬁca l t e r n a t i v e ,n a m e l y ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fs o m er u l e - o f - t h u m bﬁrms. Table 6 reports
our results for the case of dynamic indexation. Three key ﬁndings emerge. First, our point
estimates of ω are substantially smaller than those emerging under the assumption that
optimizing ﬁrms adopt the static indexation scheme. Indeed, for the full sample, our point
estimates are roughly equal to zero. Second, our point estimates of θ are similar to those
obtained when we estimated the model under the constraint that ω i se q u a lt oz e r o( s e e
Table 4). Perhaps most importantly, there is virtually no evidence of rule-of-thumb ﬁrms.
Regardless of which sample we consider or which measure of inﬂation we use, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that ω =0 . We conclude that the evidence for rule-of-thumb ﬁrms
21disappears once we allow for dynamic indexation.
6. Interpreting the Estimated Calvo Model
In Section 5 we argued that there is little evidence against the version of the Calvo model
with a one-period implementation lag, optimizing ﬁrms use the dynamic indexation scheme,
and there are no rule-of-thumb ﬁrms. However, the estimated degree of inertia in price
re-optimization implied by the model seems implausibly large. Taken at face value, these
ﬁndings indicate that the Calvo model can be rescued statistically, but not in any interesting
economic sense. However, this conclusion follows only under the maintained assumptions
that ﬁrms face a constant elasticity of demand (A =1 )and that capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(D =1 ) . In this section we explore the sensitivity of inference about θ to these assumptions.
Speciﬁcally, we analyze the quantitative trade-oﬀ between θ, the nature of capital markets,
and the elasticity of demand for intermediate goods with respect to relative prices, ².
Recall that the relationship between the reduced parameter c and the underlying pa-
rameters of the model is given by expressions (17) and (24) - (26). Suppose we have an
estimate of c and values for (β,α,δ,ζ). In the case where capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc, these
equations reduce to one equation in two unknowns, θ and ². When capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
we have two equations in three unknowns θ,ψ and ². In general, diﬀerent values of ψ and ²
imply diﬀerent values of θ that are consistent with a given estimate of c.
To explore the nature of these trade-oﬀs, we proceed as follows. We set the share of
capital in the production function, α,t o1/3, the quarterly depreciation rate of capital, δ,
to 0.025, the markup, ζ,e q u a lt o10% and the discount rate, β,t o0.99.W ec o n s i d e rt h r e e
values for ² :0 , 10 and 33.R e c a l l t h a t ² equal to zero corresponds to the Dixit - Stiglitz
case. The case of ε =1 0is consistent with results in Bergin and Feenstra (2000). The case
of ² equal to 33 is the benchmark value considered in Kimball (1995).
When ﬁrm capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc, D =1and the parameter ψ does not appear in
the model. When capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁcw ec o n s i d e rt h r e ev a l u e so fψ. First, we assume
that ψ =0 . This assumption allows us to disentangle the impact of pre-determined ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital per se from the eﬀect of capital adjustment costs. Second, we set ψ equal
to three, the value emphasized in Woodford (2003). The parameter ψ can be interpreted
as the elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q, evaluated in
steady state. As shown in the appendix, for our model, this elasticity is given by 1/(δψ).
22With δ =0 .025 and ψ =3 , this elasticity is equal to 13.3,av a l u et h a ti sl a r g er e l a t i v et o
those reported in the literature (see Christiano and Fisher 1998). In this sense, ψ =3is a
conservative choice; we would have to assume larger adjustment costs to obtain elasticities
closer to those in the literature. Finally, in results not reported here, we also considered the
case of ψ equal to inﬁnity. Here the elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect
to Tobin’s q is equal to zero. This case corresponds to Sbordone’s (2002) assumption that
capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and cannot be augmented over time. As it turns out, raising ψ from
three to inﬁnity to ψ = ∞ h a sv e r yl i t t l ei m p a c to no u rﬁndings.
Table 7 reports results based on estimates of c implied by Table 4 (τ =1 , dynamic index-
ation and no rule-of-thumb ﬁrms). The values in square brackets represent 95% conﬁdence
intervals.17 Since our ﬁndings are similar for the two inﬂation measures, we focus on the
GDP deﬂator case. Three key results emerge from Table 7. First, as anticipated, θ is a
declining function of ². For example, when capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc, the point estimate of
θ falls from 0.88 to 0.76 as ² rises from the benchmark value of 0 to 33. This fall corresponds
to a decline in the average frequency with which ﬁrms re-optimize prices from roughly two
years to one year. Second, for any given value of ², θ decreases if we assume that capital is
ﬁrm-speciﬁc. For ψ =3 , our point estimate of θ is less than 0.75 (a re-optimization rate of at
least one year) regardless of which value of ² we work with. By comparing the case of ψ =0
and ψ =3 , we see that the fall in θ is partly attributable to the eﬀect of predetermined
capital per se and partly to the eﬀect of capital adjustment costs. As mentioned above,
assuming larger adjustment costs has very little impact on inference regarding θ. Third,
conditional on the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, there is only marginal evidence against
the null hypothesis that ﬁrms re-optimize prices every half-year.18
Table 8 reports the analog statistics calculated for values of c estimated allowing for a
break in the sample period. Notice that the qualitative results from Table 7 are very robust
to this change: allowing for a non-constant elasticity of demand or ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital leads
to lower values of θ. Perhaps more importantly, the reported values of θ are lower than those
r e p o r t e di ne i t h e rT a b l e4o rT a b l e7 . I ti su s e f u lt of o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hc a p i t a li s
17These intervals were calculated as follows. Using the information from Table 4, we construct a 95%
conﬁdence interval for c. Then, for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of our model, we compute the values of θ
that correspond to the lower and upper values of the conﬁdence intervals for c. Using these values of θ, we
computed the corresponding lower and upper values of 1/(1 − θ).
18The conﬁdence intervals for the statistic 1/(1 − θ) are asymmetric. Because of the nonlinear nature of
this function, the right hand tail of the reported conﬁdence intervals are very large.
23ﬁrm-speciﬁc. With ψ =3 , our point estimate of θ is substantially lower than 0.75, varying
from a low of 0.56 to a high of 0.67, depending on the value of ² we assume. So the average
amount of time between price re-optimization ranges from 2.3 and roughly 3 quarters. In no
case can we reject the hypothesis that ﬁrms re-optimize prices on average every 2 quarters.
We conclude by discussing the relationship between the properties of our estimated model
and recent ﬁndings in the literature regarding the degree of price stickiness based on micro-
economic data. Using disaggregated CPI data from the greater New York metropolitan area
over the period 1988 to 1997, Golosov and Lucas (2003) report that roughly 21.9% of prices
of items in the CPI basket remain unchanged each month. Using data from New York,
Chicago and Los Angeles over the sample period 1988-2003, Klenow and Krystov (2003)
report that 24.8% of prices of items in the CPI basket remain unchanged every month.19
Comparing our variants of the Calvo model with these ﬁndings is delicate. At one level,
the models in this paper imply that prices change too frequently relative to the micro data.
This is because with price indexation, all prices are changing all the time. An even more
subtle diﬃculty is that just because ﬁrms are changing prices does not mean that they have
re-optimized those prices: a subset of the price changes being recorded could reﬂect various
forms of time dependent price updating rules. So, in principle, our model could be consistent
with ﬁndings that prices change all the time.
Despite these diﬃculties, we think it is still useful to compare the average frequency with
which ﬁrms re-optimize prices in the estimated version of our model with the ﬁndings in
Golosov and Lucas and Klenow and Krystov. Golosov and Lucas’ estimates imply that ﬁrms
change prices once every 1.9 quarters, while Klenow and Krystov’s estimates imply that
ﬁrms change prices roughly every 1.7 − 1.8 quarters. Table 8 indicates that, based on the
GDP deﬂa t o r ,i nt h ev e r s i o no ft h em o d e lw i t hﬁrm speciﬁc capital and ψ =3 , we can never
reject the hypothesis that ﬁrms re-optimize prices, on average, every 1.8 quarters. With the
PCE deﬂator, we can never reject the hypothesis that ﬁrms re-optimize prices, on average,
every 1.9 quarters. In this sense, our model seems consistent with the ﬁndings in Golosov
and Lucas and Klenow and Krystov.
We are not claiming that our variants of the Calvo model are literally ‘true’. There
are some obvious aspects of these models that are counterfactual, such as the implication
19In both cases, these fractions are based on data excluding sales. Interstingly, Klenow and Krystov also
report that roughly 90% of the variance in monthly inﬂation stems solely from ﬂuctuations in the average
size of price changes. This last ﬁnding is inconsistent with a large class of state dependent pricing models.
24that some ﬁrms never re-optimize prices. Nevertheless, the degree of inertia in price re-
optimization implied by the estimated version of our model does not seem implausible relative
to the ﬁndings in Golosov and Lucas and Klenow and Krystov.
7. Conclusion
This paper assesses the empirical performance of the Calvo model of sticky goods prices. We
a r g u et h a tav e r s i o no ft h em o d e li nw h i c ht h e r ei sao n e - q u a r t e rd e l a yi nt h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o n
of new prices and dynamic indexation renders the model consistent with the aggregate data
in a statistical sense. A separate question is whether the estimated model implies plausible
inertia in price setting behavior by ﬁrms. On the face of it, the answer to this question is
no: our benchmark model implies that ﬁrms re-optimize prices roughly once every seven
quarters.
However, this conclusion is not warranted once we abandon two special auxiliary as-
sumptions associated with standard expositions of the Calvo model: (i) monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms face a constant elasticity of demand and (ii) capital is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc
and can be instantaneously reallocated after a shock. Once we abandon these assumptions,
the estimated model implies a degree of inertia in price re-optimization that is much more
plausible. Speciﬁcally, it is consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms re-optimize prices at
least once every two quarters. This result holds even though the model is observationally
equivalent to the original model in terms of its implications for the time series data on
inﬂation.
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27Appendix
In this appendix we describe the following: (i) data sources, (ii) how to interpret the
parameter A, (iii) the model without rental markets for capital and D, and (iv) how to
assess the magnitude of the adjustment cost parameter, ψ.
Data
Our data are from the Haver Analytics database. For each data series below, we provide
a brief description and, in parenthesis, the Haver codes for the series used.
• Price measures: GDP deﬂator is the ratio of nominal GDP (GDP) and real chain-
weighted GDP (GDPH); personal consumption expenditures deﬂator (JCBM2).
• Real marginal costs: Share of labor income in nominal output for the non-farm business
sector, which is proportional to the Bureau of Labor Statistics measure of nominal unit
labor costs divided by the non-farm business deﬂator (LXNFU/LXNFI).
• Adjusted real marginal costs: Per capita hours - hours non-farm business sector
(LXNFH) divided by over-16 population (LN16N); Capital-output ratio - annual pri-
vate ﬁxed capital (EPQ) interpolated with quarterly private ﬁxed investment (FH)
divided by GDP (GDPH), all variables in chained 1996 dollars.
• Instruments: Quadratically detrended real GDP is the residual of a linear regression
of real GDP (GDPH) on a constant, t and t2;i n ﬂation is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log
of the price measures; growth rate of nominal wages is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of
nominal compensation in the non-farm business sector (LXNFC).
Interpreting A










The coeﬃcient A can be written
A =
1 − 1/¯ η
2+G000(1)/G00(1)
(37)
where ¯ η = −G0(1)/G00(1) is the steady state elasticity of demand. Note that in steady state
an intermediate good ﬁrm sets price as a markup over marginal cost, where the markup, ζ,
is ¯ η/(¯ η − 1) − 1.






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x=1
.
This is the percent change in the elasticity of demand due to a one percent change in the
own price at the steady state. The value of ² can be derived in terms of A and ¯ η (or ζ) using




























Notice that under Dixit-Stiglitz, when A =1 ,²=0 .T h i si st ob ee x p e c t e d :u n d e rD i x i t -






Firm-Speciﬁc Capital with the Kimball Speciﬁcation
In this section we describe the solution to the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and the
Kimball speciﬁcation of the ﬁnal good technology. Our derivation follows Christiano (2004)
and Woodford (2004), who consider ﬁrm- speciﬁc capital with the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation.
The model is identical to the one described in section 2.1 except that, in addition to the usual
Calvo price-setting, at each date t − τ all intermediate good ﬁrms choose date t +1capital
subject to adjustment costs.20 Labor continues to be hired in economy-wide competitive
labor markets. Firms take all aggregate variables as given, including the return on risk-free
one-period real bonds, Rt. Below we focus on the static indexation case. The derivation
under dynamic indexation is similar.
The objective of a randomly chosen intermediate ﬁrm i at date t − τ,b e f o r ei tk n o w s















subject to (2) and (15). Here Λt+j =
Q∞
l=0 πt+j+1/Rt+j and It+j is the investment of the i’th
intermediate ﬁrm. In (38), we have substituted out for labor using the production function.
Also, we have assumed, without loss of generality, that the price of investment goods is the
same as that for consumption.










20In practice we only require that it be made at least τ periods before date t. Assuming otherwise
complicates the analysis in a manner described below.
29Linearizing average marginal cost, st =
R 1


























ˆ Kit − ˆ Kt
i
.
Linearizing the ﬁrst order condition associated with the price choice (in the event that it









(1 + ξA¯ η)ˆ pit+j − Aˆ st+j + ξAˆ kit+j
i
=0 (39)
where A is deﬁn e di n( 9 ) ,ˆ kit ≡
h
ˆ Kit − ˆ Kt
i
, ξ ≡ α/(1−α), pit+j ≡ Pit+j/Pt+j, and b x denotes
percent deviation of x from its steady state value. Also, ˆ Ei
t−τXit+k denotes the expectation
of the random variable Xit+k, conditional on date t−τ information and on the event that the
i’th ﬁrm optimizes its price in period t, but not in any period after that, up to and including
t + k.
Linearizing the ﬁrst order condition for the choice of t+1capital (regardless of whether





= ΞEt−τˆ pit+1, (40)
where
Q(L)=β − φL + L
2,












Here L is the lag operator. Also, Et−τ denotes the expectation operator, conditional on date
t − τ information, where the expectation integrates over all possible continuation histories
associated with the date t−τ information, including histories in which ﬁrm i reoptimizes its
price. A comparable expression is derived in Woodford (2003, p. 689).








t is the percent deviation from steady state of the average optimized relative price
set in period t.
Following Christiano (2004) and Woodford (2004), we solve (39) and (40) using the
30methodofundeterminedcoeﬃcients and combine this solution with (41) to derive the reduced





t − νˆ kit, (42)
where ν is a number to be determined and ˆ p∗
t is a function of aggregate variables only, which
is also to be determined. Note that, according to our assumptions, the variables on the right
hand side of (42) are known when the price decision is made at t − τ. The capital decision
of a ﬁrm is assumed to satisfy:
ˆ kit+1 = κ1ˆ kit + κ2Et−τˆ pit, (43)
where κ1 and κ2 a r et ob ed e t e r m i n e d .H e r e ,t h ev a r i a b l eˆ pit denotes the i’th ﬁrm’s price,
whether optimized or not. If the ﬁrm is not reoptimizing at date t−τ, then ˆ pit is not in the
information set used to choose ˆ kit+1. This is why we have Et−τ in (43).
The requirement that (42) and (43) must be satisﬁed for all possible realizations of ˆ p∗
t, ˆ kit
and Et−τˆ pit implies the unknown coeﬃcients, κ1, κ2 and ν must satisfy the following three
equations, subject to |κ1| < 1:
1 − [φ +( 1− θ)ν (βκ2 − Ξ)]κ1 + βκ
2
1 =0




(1 + ¯ ηξA)(1− βθκ1)+ξAβθκ2
− ν =0 .
Christiano (2004) incorporates industry-speciﬁc labor in this model. Except for this dif-
ference, these three equations are equivalent to analogous equations he derives under the
assumption of a constant elasticity of demand, A =1 .
Following Christiano (2004), we can derive an expression for ˆ p∗
t using the linearized ﬁrst








(1 − βθκ1)(1− βθ)





By substituting this expression into (41), we obtain the following equation relating inﬂation
to average marginal cost:
ˆ πt = βEt−τˆ πt+1 +
1 − θ
θ




(1 + ¯ ηξA)(1− βθκ1)+ξAβθκ2
.
When adjustment costs go to inﬁnity, that is as ψ →∞ , then κ1 → 1 and κ2 → 0.I n





31Under Dixit-Stiglitz, A =1and ¯ η = µ, in which case D corresponds to the coeﬃcient derived
by Sbordone (2002) for her model of constant capital.
When there are no adjustment costs (ψ =0 )i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t
κ1 =0 , κ2 = −˜ Ξ/˜ φ, ν = ξA(1 − βθ)/[(1 + ¯ ηξA)+ξAβθκ2]
where ˜ Ξ =( 1− β(1 − δ))¯ η/(1 − α) and ˜ φ =1+β +( 1− β(1 − δ))/(1 − α). In this case
D =
1
(1 + ¯ ηξA) − ξAβθ˜ Ξ/˜ φ
.
Interpreting the Adjustment Cost Parameter, ψ
In the model without capital rental markets, what is an empirically plausible value for the
capital adjustment cost parameter, ψ? Typically, the magnitude of capital adjustment costs
is assessed by considering its implications for the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio
with respect to Tobin’s q. To do this in our model, we assume the existence of a competitive
stock market in which claims on the proﬁts of intermediate good ﬁrms are traded. Under
our assumptions, in general, intermediate good ﬁrms will be valued diﬀerently.






it denotes the marginal value of capital at ﬁrm i installed at the beginning of
time t +1and PIt is the price of investment goods, which is unity, since investment and
consumption goods are both derived from the composite ﬁnal good. Proﬁt maximization







where MPIt = dKit+1/dIt is the marginal product of investment in producing installed
date t =1capital. The marginal product of investment can be derived by diﬀerentiat-
ing equation (15). Under the assumption that Ki,t is predetermined at date t this yields









The desired elasticity may be derived by diﬀerentiation of (44) and (15). Diﬀerenti-
ating (44) yields dKit+1/dqit = Kit/Q00(Kit+1/Kit) and (15) implies d(Iit/Kit)/dKit+1 =



































where we have dropped subscripts to denote steady state values of variables. Equation (45)
follows since Q0 (1) = 1,Q 00 (1) = ψ, q =1and I/K = δ.
33Table 1. Estimates of the Standard Model with Static Indexing
Inﬂation L =0 L =1 2
Measure θ JT θ JT
1959:I-2001:IV
GDP Deﬂator 0.90 28.2 0.91 10.2
(0.05) [9e-5] (0.03) [0.04]
PCE Deﬂator 0.87 36.9 0.88 11.1
(0.04) [2e-6] (0.02) [0.03]
1959:I-1979:II
GDP Deﬂator 0.86 12.1 0.87 4.58
(0.05) [0.02] (0.03) [0.33]
PCE Deﬂator 0.82 16.8 0.83 5.60
(0.04) [0.02] (0.02) (0.23)
1982:III-2001:IV
GDP Deﬂator 0.87 15.8 0.90 6.16
(0.04) [0.003] (0.03) [0.19]
PCE Deﬂator 0.87 8.89 0.89 4.39
(0.04) [0.06] (0.03) [0.36]
Notes: The JT statistics are distributed as χ2 random variables with 4 degrees of freedom.
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. In the L =1 2cases, the Newey-West
correction to the weighting matrix is used.
34Table 2. Estimates of the Standard model with Dynamic Indexing
Inﬂation L =0 L =1 2
Measure θ JT θ JT
1959:I-2001:IV
GDP Deﬂator 0.81 35.0 0.91 10.2
(0.03) [6e-7] (0.02) [0.04]
PCE Deﬂator 0.79 47.9 0.88 10.8
(0.03) [1e-9] (0.02) [0.03]
1959:I-1979:II
GDP Deﬂator 0.76 17.5 0.87 5.59
(0.05) [0.002] (0.04) [0.23]
PCE Deﬂator 0.77 18.1 0.88 5.80
(0.04) [0.002] (0.03) (0.22)
1982:III-2001:IV
GDP Deﬂator 0.68 17.0 0.83 4.41
(0.04) [0.002] (0.08) [0.35]
PCE Deﬂator 0.54 14.2 0.77 4.54
(0.03) [0.007] (0.06) [0.34]
Notes: The JT statistics are distributed as χ2 random variables with 3 degrees of freedom.
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. In the L =1 2 , cases the Newey-West
correction to the weighting matrix is used.
35Table 3: Prices Chosen One Period In Advance with Static Indexing
Inﬂation Full Sample 1959:I-1979:II 1982:III-2001:IV
Measure θ JT θ JT θ JT
GDP Deﬂator 0.89 6.89 0.84 2.96 0.92 3.98
(0.03) [0.14] (0.03) [0.56] (0.04) [0.41]
PCE Deﬂator 0.90 8.54 0.83 2.95 0.91 3.50
(0.03) [0.07] (0.05) [0.56] [0.05] [0.48]
Notes: The JT statistics are distributed as χ2 random variables with 3 degrees of freedom.
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets.
Table 4: Prices Chosen One Period In Advance with Dynamic Indexing
Inﬂation Full Sample 1959:I-1979:II 1982:III-2001:IV
Measure θ JT θ JT θ JT
GDP Deﬂator 0.88 2.65 0.86 0.89 0.83 6.33
(0.05) [0.62] (0.09) [0.93] (0.05) [0.18]
PCE Deﬂator 0.86 4.98 0.84 2.05 0.83 5.61
(0.05) [0.29] (0.08) [0.73] (0.06) [0.23]
Notes: This table considers the case where ﬁr m st h a td on o tr e s e tt h e i rp r i c ep l a n su s et h e
updating scheme: Pit = πt−1Pit−1.T h eJT statistics are distributed as χ2 random variables
with 3 degrees of freedom. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets.
Table 5: Prices Chosen One Period In Advance, Static Indexing, and Rule of Thumb Firms
Inﬂation Full Sample 1959:I-1979:II 1982:III-2001:IV
Measure θωJT θωJT θωJT
GDP Deﬂator 0.85 0.44 0.92 0.88 0.51 0.68 0.85 0.37 0.73
(0.08) (0.17) [0.82] (0.11) (0.32) [0.97] (0.12) (0.28) [0.87]
PCE Deﬂator 0.96 0.56 1.66 0.97 0.72 0.73 0.48 0.80 0.12
(0.09) (0.22) [0.64] (0.09) (0.35) [0.87] (0.18) (0.08) [0.99]
Notes: This table considers the case where (1 − ω) of ﬁrms that have the opportunity to
change prices do so optimally, while ω are of the Gali-Gertler type; that is, they set prices
according to P0
t = πt−1 ¯ Pt−1.w h e r e¯ Pt =( 1− ω)P∗
t + ωP0
t. When unable to reset the price
plan, all ﬁrms use the same updating scheme, Pit =¯ πPit−1.T h eJT statistics are distributed
as χ2 random variables with 3 degrees of freedom. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values
in brackets.
36Table 6: Prices Chosen One Period In Advance,
Dynamic Indexing, and Rule of Thumb Firms
Inﬂation Full Sample 1959:I-1979:II 1982:III-2001:IV
Measure θωJT θωJT θωJT
GDP Deﬂator 0.87 0.04 2.79 0.83 0.12 0.61 0.82 0.15 6.12
(0.05) (0.14) [0.43] (0.10) (0.22) [0.89] (0.07) (0.26) [0.11]
PCE Deﬂator 0.88 -0.06 4.79 0.85 -0.02 1.85 0.76 0.40 5.67
(0.06) (0.15) [0.19] (0.09) (0.18) [0.60] (0.63) (2.73) [0.13]
Notes: This table considers the case where (1 − ω) of ﬁrms that have the opportunity
to change prices do so optimally and use dynamic indexing when they do not have the
opportunity to reset the price plan. In addition, ω ﬁrms are of the type Gali-Gertler con-
sidered in their paper. That is, they set prices P0
it according to P0
it = πt−1 ¯ Pt−1, where
¯ Pt =( 1 −ω)P∗
t +ωP0
t when they have the opportunity to reset their plan, but use Pit =¯ πPit−1.
The JT statistics are distributed as χ2 random variables with 3 degrees of freedom. Standard
errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets.
Table 7: Frequency of Reoptimization with Prices Chosen One Period
in Advance and Dynamic Indexing: Full Sample Results
Rental Market Firm-Speciﬁc Capital
for Capital ψ =0 ψ =3




GDP 00 .88 8.30 .83 5.90 .72 3.6
[0.78,0.98] [4.5,50.0] [0.65,0.97] [2.9,33.3] [0.53,0.95] [2.1,20.0]
10 0.83 5.90 .79 4.80 .70 3.3
[0.70,0.96] [3.3,25.0] [0.60,0.96] [2.5,25.0] [0.51,0.94] [2.0,16.7]
33 0.76 4.20 .72 3.60 .66 2.9
[0.60,0.95] [2.5,20.0] [0.52,0.94] [2.1,16.7] [0.46,0.93] [1.9,14.3]
PCE 00 .86 7.10 .80 5.00 .69 3.2
[0.77,0.96] [4.3,25.0] [0.62,0.95] [2.6,20.0] [0.51,0.91] [2.0,11.0]
10 0.81 5.30 .76 4.20 .67 3.0
[0.68,0.94] [3.1,16.7] [0.57,0.93] [2.3,14.3] [0.49,0.90] [2.0,10.0]
33 0.73 3.70 .69 3.20 .63 2.7
[0.57,0.91] [2.3,11.1] [0.49,0.91] [2.0,11.1] [0.44,0.88] [1.8,8.3]
Note: Estimates based on labor’s share equal to 2/3, a 10% markup and a 2.5% quarterly
depreciation rate.
37Table 8: Frequency of Reoptimization with Prices Chosen One Period
in Advance and Dynamic Indexing: Sub-Sample Results
Panel A: 1959:I-1979:II
Rental Market Firm-Speciﬁc Capital
for Capital ψ =0 ψ =3




GDP 00 .86 7.10 .79 4.80 .67 3.0
[0.73,0.98] [3.7,50.0] [0.56,0.98] [2.3,50.0] [0.45,0.96] [1.8,25.0]
10 0.80 5.00 .75 4.00 .65 2.9
[0.64,0.97] [2.8,33.3] [0.50,0.97] [2.0,33.3] [0.43,0.96] [1.8,25.0]
33 0.72 3.60 .68 3.10 .61 2.6
[0.52,0.96] [2.1,25.0] [0.43,0.96] [1.8,20.0] [0.38,0.94] [1.6,16.7]
PCE 00 .84 6.30 .80 5.00 .65 2.9
[0.75,0.94] [4.0,16.7] [0.62,0.95] [2.6,20.0] [0.48,0.89] [1.9,9.1]
10 0.78 4.60 .76 4.20 .63 2.7
[0.66,0.91] [2.9,11.1] [0.57,0.93] [2.3,14.3] [0.46,0.86] [1.9,6.7]
33 0.70 3.30 .69 3.20 .59 2.4
[0.55,0.87] [2.2,7.7] [0.49,0.91] [2.0,11.1] [0.41,0.82] [1.7,5.6]
Panel B: 1982:III-2001:IV
Rental Market Firm-Speciﬁc Capital
for Capital ψ =0 ψ =3




GDP 00 .83 5.90 .75 4.00 .63 2.7
[0.73,0.93] [3.7,14.3] [0.56,0.92] [2.3,12.5] [0.45,0.85] [1.8,6.7]
10 0.77 4.40 .70 3.30 .60 2.5
[0.64,0.90] [2.8,10.0] [0.51,0.90] [2.0,10.0] [0.43,0.84] [1.8,6.2]
33 0.68 3.10 .62 2.60 .56 2.3
[0.52,0.86] [2.1,7.1] [0.43,0.85] [1.8,6.7] [0.38,0.81] [1.6,5.3]
PCE 00 .83 5.90 .80 5.00 .63 2.7
[0.71,0.95] [3.5,20.0] [0.62,0.95] [2.6,20.0] [0.43,0.91] [1.8,11.1]
10 0.77 4.40 .76 4.20 .60 2.5
[0.62,0.92] [2.6,12.5] [0.57,0.93] [2.3,14.3] [0.41,0.89] [1.7,9.1]
33 0.68 3.10 .69 3.20 .56 2.3
[0.50,0.89] [2.0,9.1] [0.49,0.91] [2.0,11.1] [0.36,0.85] [1.6,6.7]
Note: Estimates based on labor’s share equal to 2/3, a 10% markup, and a 2.5% quarterly
depreciation rate.
38